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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)( f) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err by overruling the Defendant's

objection and permitting the State's expert witnesses to express
opinions as to what constitutes materiality in a securities fraud
case?
Standard of Appellate Review:

While decisions to admit

evidence are reviewed for "abuse of discretion", ff[w]hether a piece
of evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always
review questions of law under a correctness standard . . . . [I]t
is possible that we might refer casually to this standard as an
'abuse of discretion' standard.

In fact, it is not."

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).

State v.

State v. Clayton,

646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982).
2.

Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury

that specific intent to defraud is an element of the offense of
securities fraud under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) and (3) and 61-1-21?
Standard of Appellate Review: A trial court's interpretation of statutory law is reviewed for correctness.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).

State v.

State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d

723, 726 (Utah 1982); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-608 (Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1974); State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93);
State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989).
3. Did the trial court err by failing to give an instruction
to the jury that the good faith of the Defendant was a complete
defense to a prosecution under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(1), (2) and (3) and
61-1-21?
Standard of Appellate Review: A trial court's interpretation of statutory law is reviewed for correctness.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).

State v.

State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d

723, 726 (Utah 1982); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-608 (Utah
1974); State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93);
State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989).
4.

Did the Defendant receive ineffective assistance of

counsel at trial?
Standard of Appellate Review:

Legal correctness.

"But

a correctness review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial
court's

resolution

of

factual

questions

and

the

associated

determination of credibility that may underlie the decision to
admit.

This subsidiary determination will be overturned only if

clearly erroneous.

Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Bountiful v. Riley, 784

P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Grayson Roper v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467, 470-71 (Utah 1989)."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3

(Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
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1070 (Utah 1985); State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah
1/7/93).
5. Did the trial court err by failing to dismiss Count IV of
the Amended Information because the facts proven at trial did not
constitute a public offense?
Standard

of

Appellate

Review:

Legal

correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884,
887 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991); State
v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93); State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).
6.

Did the trial court err by failing to dismiss Counts II

and III because the facts proven at trial did not constitute a
public offense?
Standard

of

Appellate

Review:

Legal

correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884,
887 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991); State
v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1/7/93).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a Judgment and Conviction entered
against the Defendant from his convictions on four counts of
Securities Fraud, in violation of U.C.A. § 61-1-21.

The Judgment

and Conviction was entered by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat on
September 25, 1992. Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial or in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Alternative, Motion in Arrest of Judgment on or about January
28, 1992.

By Minute Entry dated May 22, 1992, the Honorable

Richard H. Moffat denied the Defendant's Motion for New Trial and
Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on

September 25, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 11, 1988, the Defendant became affiliated with
Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc. (hereinafter

"Private

Ledger") as a stockbroker (Tr. 716). The Defendant had been in the
brokerage business since 1975 (Tr. 1124) and had passed several
examinations

required

in the

securities

industry

(Tr. 703).

Private Ledger mailed the Defendant a procedures manual on April
29, 1988 (Tr. 715) and received the Defendant's acknowledgement he
had read its contents on May 11, 1988 (Tr. 715).

In 1988, the

Defendant learned about a limited partnership in undeveloped real
property in the Mesa and Phoenix, Arizona, areas.
partnership was known as Red River Mountain.

The limited

The Defendant was

offered an opportunity to sell limited partnership interests in the
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership by the general partner, Ross
Farnsworth (Tr. 1141-1145).
For over thirteen years, the Defendant had acted as the
investment broker for three clients: Seymour Issacs, Frank Brgoch,
and Virl Thornton (Tr. 33, 200, 291). For many years the Defendant
had been given discretion by his clients to make investments on
their behalf (Tr. 206, 299, 1151). In the Defendant's professional
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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judgment, Red River Mountain was the type of investment suitable
for Mssrs. Issacs, Brgoch and Thornton based on their investment
expectations and their investment history with him.
On April 11, 1988, Seymour Issacs purchased six units of Red
River Mountain for a total investment of $30,600.00. On April 29,
1988, Virl Thornton purchased three units of Red River Mountain for
a total investment of $15,300.00. On April 11, 1988, Frank Brgoch
purchased six units of Red River Mountain for a total investment of
$30,600.00. Each investor was issued a certificate on or about May
9, 1988, indicating their interest was fully paid and nonassessable. However, annual payments were called due by Red River
Mountain in 1989 and thereafter.
The Defendant knew that Private Ledger had not performed any
due diligence on the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership.
However, the Defendant's manager at Private Ledger, Craig Cannon,
advised the Defendant that he had notified Private Ledger and
obtained clearance for the sale of the Red River Mountain Limited
Partnership (Tr. 1081, 1109). Other stockbrokers were also advised
by the manager that the sales of the limited partnership had been
approved by Private Ledger (Tr. 1156).
The State alleged, inter

alia,

that when the Defendant sold

the limited partnership interests to his clients, he willfully made
an untrue statement of a material fact to Mr. Thornton (that he had
purchased units in Red River Mountain for both himself and his
father

and that

he was

"selling

away") (Tr. 641-642, 644);

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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willfully omitted to state a material fact to Brgoch and Issacs
(that they might be liable for future payments and that he was
"selling away") (Tr. 831, 923). Additionally, the State contended
the sale of the limited partnerships constituted securities fraud
against Private Ledger because he intended to defraud Private
Ledger of its percentage of the commission generated by the sale of
the units of Red River Mountain to Issacs, Brgoch and Thornton.
At the trial, the State was permitted, over objection, to
present the "expert" testimony of Steven Neilson, the Assistant
Director of the State of Utah Division of Securities, who opined
that certain facts not disclosed

to investors were material

omissions (Tr. 895, 900). The Defendant was convicted by a jury of
all four counts of Securities Fraud.
The Defendant moved the trial court for a new trial or for an
arrest of judgment on all four counts. The Defendant's Motion for
New Trial and for Arrest of Judgment were both denied. This appeal
followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Expert testimony on materiality under the securities law

is improper.

The trial court incorrectly admitted the opinion

testimony of a compliance officer of the Defendant's brokerage
house and the Assistant Director of the Utah State Division of
Securities that certain facts allegedly omitted by the Defendant in
his discussion with three investors were "material". The Court of
Appeals, in the case of State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1992), held that the testimony was permissible because it went to
"an ultimate issue of fact."

In so ruling, the Court relied on

vacated case authority and misconstrued Rule 704 Utah R.Evid. which
abolished the "ultimate fact" rule. The Court of Appeals' decision
conflicts with securities cases holding that expert testimony on
materiality is inadmissible.
2.

Intent to defraud is an element of a violation of U.C.A.

§§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. The trial court erred by ruling that intent
to defraud is not an element of securities fraud under U.C.A.
§§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21.

The Court of Appeals reached the same

decision in State v. Larsen, supra.

This interpretation collides

with the interpretation of the related federal provision, Federal
Rule 10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, on which Utah's
act was patterned and with which Utah's law was intended to
harmonize.

See U.C.A. § 61-1-27.

A violation of Rule 10b-5

requires such intent.
3. Good faith is a defense to securities fraud.

Consistent-

ly/ good faith has been interpreted to be a defense under Rule
10b-5.

Utah's legislature intended U.C.A. § 61-1-1 to have the

same interpretation.

The trial court disagreed.

State v. Larsen, supra, also disagreed.

The Court in

The Larsen decision

permits a strict-liability conviction with possible imprisonment,
as in this case, without proof of either an intent to defraud and
regardless of the Defendant's good faith belief in his conduct.
828 P.2d at 495-496.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4 . The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defense counsel failed to deliver an opening statement in this
complicated securities fraud case.

Additionally, defense counsel

failed to introduce essential exculpatory evidence bearing upon the
suitability of the three investors for the Red River Mountain
Limited Partnership.

Although the investors each testified that

they had advised the Defendant that they were not interested in
either risky investments or investments requiring future payments,
their investment records with this Defendant belied those assertions.

In asserting this argument, the Defendant does not suggest

that the mere suitability of the investors would preclude the
Defendant from being guilty of securities fraud by failing to make
a material disclosure.

Rather, the Defendant asserts that the

investment portfolio of the three investors was relevant because
the nature of their investments contradicted their assertions that
they had told the Defendant of their unwillingness to be involved
in an investment like Red River Mountain Limited Partnership.
Additionally, defense counsel failed to object when the State
introduced

evidence

through

the

compliance

officer

of

the

Defendant's brokerage house and an attorney from the Utah Securities Division who testified, inter alia,

that the Defendant's

failure to disclose the possibility of future payments, that he was
"selling away," and that his conduct was unethical and violated
NASD rules, were irrelevant and immaterial to the jury's determination of whether the Defendant had violated U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and 61Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1-21.

Whether the Defendant's conduct violated internal policies

of his brokerage house, or even that the Defendant would be held in
low esteem by members of his profession, should have been excluded
under Rule 403, Utah R.Evid.
Defense counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Additionally, because the trial was permeated with
an aura that the Defendant was an unethical stockbroker, trial
counsel's cumulative errors establish a reasonable probability that
but for the counsel's errors and omissions, the outcome of the
trial would have been different.
5.

The facts proven at trial in Count 4 do not constitute

securities fraud.

The State contended in Counts 1, 2, and 3 that

the Defendant was guilty of securities fraud because he had failed
to disclose facts which were material to an investor's investment
decision. The State presented the testimony of all three investors
that the Defendant had failed to disclose the possibility of future
payments and had also failed to disclose that Private Ledger, his
brokerage house, had not performed any due diligence regarding the
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership.

All three investors

testified that the implicit endorsement of the sale of the limited
partnership by the brokerage house was important to their decision
to invest in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership.
The State also argued that the Defendant was guilty of
securities fraud with Private Ledger as the victim because of his
"selling away" in Counts 1, 2, and 3.

In seeking a conviction on

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Count 4, the State is seeking more than the "pound of flesh" that
it might be due under the facts of this case. The facts proven at
trial do not establish a crime under U.C.A. § 61-1-1(3) in Count 4.
6.

The facts proven at trial do not constitute a public

offense in Counts 2 or 3.

The sale of the security - the limited

partnership - in Counts 2 and 3 does not fit within the parameters
of U.C.A. § 61-1-1.

No misrepresentations or omissions were made

by the Defendant "in connection with" the sale or purchase of the
Red

River

Mountain

units.

The

Defendant

had

discretionary

authority to make investment decisions for these investors.

If

there were any misrepresentations or omissions by the Defendant,
they occurred at a separate time from the actual purchase of the
Red River Mountain units.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING THE DEFENDANTS
OBJECTION AND PERMITTING THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS
TO EXPRESS AN OPINION AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES MATERIALITY
IN THIS SECURITIES FRAUD CASE.
At the trial of this matter, the State called Donna Nauss, a
non-lawyer, Compliance Director for Private Ledger, and Steve
Neilson, the Assistant Director of the Utah Securities Division.
Over

the

objection

of

defense

counsel, both witnesses

were

permitted to opine in front of the jury what facts constituted a
material omission by the Defendant in his dealings with the three
investors. Ms. Nauss' testimony focused upon "selling away", i.e.,
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selling a security by the stockbroker independently and without the
endorsement of the brokerage house:
Q

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Assuming that a limited partnership
had a series of possible future payments; which as
Private Ledger's position as a compliance officer, what
is Private Ledger's position on the need to disclose
those future payments with regard to this paragraph?

Mr. Barber:

Objection, your Honor.

That's not relevant.

Mr. Barber: Your Honor, as to the violating of the laws of
the State of Utah, the question is not of this agreement.

The Court:

The objection will be overruled.

Q

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Let me ask you the question again
because we didn't get an answer to it. As the compliance
officer, what is Private Ledger's position on whether
Paragraph 2-D requires disclosure of possible future
payments in a limited partnership that has no possible
future payment obligations?

A

(Ms. Nauss) The representative has an obligation to
disclose everything about the investment, including the
future payment obligations, if there are any, on the
investment.

Trial Transcript, Tr. 711-718.
And later during Ms. Nauss' testimony, she was permitted to
opine as follows:
Q

(By Mr. Sonnenreich)
Would a failure to disclose a
specific thing that you're doing that was in violation of
this policy, such as "selling away" — let's do it
specifically with something. Let's be narrow.
(Same questioner) Would a failure to disclose "selling
away" in light of these documents be an omission that, as
the compliance officer of Private Ledger, you would view
as material, and material can mean significant, important? It could—
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Barber:

Well, that's a compound question your Honor.

Mr. Sonnenreich:

Just was the definition.

The Court: Well, if she is confused, she can tell us.
The Witness: Yes, it would be an omission.
A material
omission. Its important for us to know, and I think that
you see in the "selling away" memorandum and in the
procedures manual-Trial Transcript, Tr. 766-767.
Over the objection of defense counsel, Mr. Neilson was
permitted to declare that "selling away" was illegal:
Q:

Now, looking at true selling away — we'll leave aside
this other question of what happens if you have two
brokerage houses. Is true selling away legal?

A:

No.

It is illegal.
i

Trial Transcript, Tr. 895.
Next, Mr. Neilson was permitted to opine that the possibility
of future payments was a material

issue which needed to be

disclosed to an investor (Trial Transcript, Tr. 899). He was also
permitted to express the opinion that the fact that a broker-dealer
had not subjected an offering to a due diligence search was also a
material fact which should have been disclosed to an investor
(Trial

Transcript,

Tr. 899-900).

Finally,

Mr. Neilson was

permitted to testify that the fact that an offering had been sold
away from all brokerage houses was a material fact that should have
been disclosed to a potential investor (Trial Transcript, Tr. 900).
The Court, in overruling the objection, necessarily ruled that
the question of what was "material" was a question susceptible to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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opinion testimony by experts under Rule 702 of Utah R.Evid.

The

issue of materiality about which the witnesses were testifying did
not involve scientific, technical, or other specified knowledge
required by Rule 702, Utah R.Evid.

Among other reasons, this is

so because the jury was ultimately instructed in Instruction No. 21
that:

" . . . 3.

A 'material fact' is a fact that a reasonable

person would deem important in determining whether or not to
purchase a security."

Moreover, in Instruction No. 22, this Court

advised the jury that:

"A 'material' fact is a fact that a

reasonable person in similar circumstances would deem important in
making a particular decision, such as a decision to purchase or
sell a security."

Since the standard is that of a reasonable man,

Ms. Nauss' and Mr. Neilson's testimony as to materiality were
inappropriate and unfairly prejudicial.
Furthermore, in the elements instructions involving each count
(Instructions 30 through 34), this Court instructed the jury that
to find the Defendant guilty, they must find that he willfully made
to an alleged victim "an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading." Therefore, the jury had the definition
of "material fact" and understood that finding a misrepresentation
or omission regarding a material fact was a required prerequisite
to finding Mr. Harry guilty of securities fraud in all four Counts.
With the testimony of the alleged investor-victims, and the other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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testimony presented during the trial, the question of what was
material or not material should have been left up to the jury, and
was not

so complicated

that

scientific,

technical, or other

specialized knowledge was necessary for the jury to understand the
evidence or to determine the facts at issue.
The trial court concluded that it was perfectly proper to
allow both Ms. Nauss and Mr. Neil son to opine, in essence, that
"facts" the Defendant failed to disclose to his investors were
"material."

Mr. Neilson, in effect, rendered his expert opinion

that the Defendant was guilty.

The Defendant's Motion for a New

Trial was denied by the trial court based upon this Court's
decision in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992).

The

Defendant submits that the Larsen Court relied on invalid case
authority when it found that expert testimony was proper because it
went to "an ultimate issue of fact."
1.

The Larsen Court Disregarded the Correct Analysis of
Federal Securities Actions Involving Expert Opinion and
Relied on Vacated Case Authority

Admission of the testimony of Ms. Nauss and Mr. Neilson was
error under the analysis applied in federal securities cases.
Securities cases pose unique problems in defining the scope of
proper expert testimony.

In the first of the leading decisions,

Scop v. United States, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.modified on rehearing,
856 F.2d 5 (1988), the defendant was convicted of federal securities fraud after the government introduced opinion evidence through
an SEC official offered as an expert witness.

Taken as a whole,
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the

expert

opinions

expressed

that

the

defendant's

actions

constituted "manipulation" and "fraud" which were terms of the
statute used to charge the defendant.

Scop, 846 F.2d at 138. The

Scop court found that the expert's use of statutory terms created
an improper legal conclusion:
Had Whitten [the witness] merely testified
that controlled buying and selling of the kind
alleged here can create artificial price
levels to lure outside investors, no sustainable objection could have been made. Instead
Whitten made no attempt to couch the opinion
testimony in even conclusory factual statements but drew directly on the language of the
statute and accompanying regulations concerning "manipulation" and "fraud." In essence,
his opinions were legal conclusions that were highly
prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an
expert in securities trading.
Id. at 140.
Fear that the jury may have been mislead by such testimony was
heightened by the fact that statutory terms like "manipulation" and
"scheme to defraud" are not self-defining, but have been the
subject of diverse judicial interpretation.

Id. at 140-41.

The analysis in Scop is understandable and persuasive.

Like

the expert opinion in Scop, Mr. Neilson's testimony improperly drew
on language of the statute under which the Defendant was charged —
§ 61-1-1. (Trial Transcript, Tr. 898-900); U.C.A. § 61-1-1). Mr.
Neilson's opinions "were calculated to invade the province of the
court to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as
to that law." Id. at 140 citing F.A.A. v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 622
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(2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983).

The Larsen Court

failed to address this, remarking that the expert used the legal,
statutory term "material" in a "factual" way.

State v. Larsen,

supra, at 493. Moreover, like the statutory term "manipulation,",
disapproved for expert use in Scop, "materiality," an element of
the offense charged here, is not a self-defining term.

Id.

Other securities cases confirm the problems associated with
use of "securities expert" testimony regarding legal standards. In
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977), a "securities expert"
testified concerning what he thought the contract phrase "best
efforts" meant, and whether or not the defendants there had used
"best efforts."

Id.

at 509.

The expert also testified that

failure to issue a registration statement within 70 days was proof
that "best efforts" were not used.

_Id. at 510.

Finding this

testimony an inadmissible legal opinion concerning "reasonableness"
of delay in registration, the Marx court noted that securities
fraud litigation presents a special danger of abuse of expert
witness testimony:

"With the growth of intricate securities

litigation . . . we must be especially careful not to allow trials
before juries to become battles of paid advocates posing as experts
on the respective sides concerning matters of domestic law."

Id.

at 511.
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986) is
another example.

There, the defendants attempted to call as an
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expert witness an attorney who was former counsel for the defendants.

The attorney was to testify concerning whether certain

omitted information was "material" to an investment decision. The
court held such testimony inadmissible because the expert would in
effect "testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of the securities laws to the transactions [at issue], giving
his expert opinion on the governing law."

_Id. at 368.

These cases reveal that while the opinions of Nauss and
Neilson were not improper just because they went to an "ultimate
issue,"

they

were

improper

because

they

are

not

"otherwise

admissible" (Rule 704, Utah R.Evid.); they "were legal conclusions
that were highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as
an expert in securities trading."

Scop, 846 F.2d at 140.*

Like

the testimony in Marx and Adalman, the objectionable portions of
Neilsonfs testimony "did not concern practices in the securities
business on which [he] was qualified as an expert, but were rather

•^oth Marx and Adalman implicitly recognize the risk that
experts in areas of law have their own ideas not only as to what
the law requires, but what they think it should require. Often, as
here, this line is blurred in the mind of the witness, let alone
the juror's minds. These cases also recognize that testimony of
legal experts in securities fraud cases presents significant
conceptual problems which reach beyond securities issues. See,
e.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
1986) ("If such experts are to testify to the meaning and applicability of securities laws, what line is to be drawn to exclude tort
lawyers from offering their expert opinions to the jury as to the
meaning and applicability of laws governing tort litigation.
Examples of this sort could be multiplied across the gamut of
litigation").
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legal opinions as to the meaning of the . . . terms at issue."
Marx at 509.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this authority and relied
instead on language from United States v. Leuben, 812 F.2d 179 (5th
Cir. 1987), which apparently unknown to the Court of Appeals, was
previously vacated.

See United States v. Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032,

1033 (5th Cir. 1987).2

Leuben, which involved neither securities

claims nor actual testimony, consists of two reported decisions;
the first, (the only one the Court of Appeals cites) noted that the
parties had simply assumed that the issue of materiality under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 was a question of law, while under 18 U.S.C. § 1014
it was an issue of fact.

812 F.2d at 183.

Relying on that

assumption, the Leuben court held that expert testimony on a
"factual" issue of materiality was permissible. _Id. It also held
that under Rule 403 FedR.Evid., the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the government to put on expert testimony on
"materiality" while prohibiting similar testimony by the defense.
Id. at 184.
The second Leuben decision

(overlooked

by the Court of

Appeals), vacated its prior assumption that "materiality" was a
fact question and held that the issue correctly was one of the law.
Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987). Given this subsequent
2

Stating that it was "persuaded by Leuben", the Court of
Appeals characterized the case as follows: "In Leuben, the Fifth
Circuit held that expert opinion on materiality was admissible as
being fact-oriented." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 at 493.
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correction, Leuben plainly does not stand for the proposition
attributed to it by the Court of Appeals.

State v. Larsen, supra,

at 493.
More importantly, even if the analysis of the first Leuben
decision were valid, it would exclude Nauss and Neilson's testimony.

The Leuben court characterized the proffered testimony as

"fact-oriented" because it would have been phrased in terms of
whether certain false statements would "'have the capacity to
influence' a loan officer, not the legal question of whether the
statements were 'material.'"

Leuben, 812 F.2d at 184. Here, the

responses of both Nauss and Neilson entered forbidden ground when
they characterized information as "material."
Tr. 766-767, 898-900).

(Trial Transcript,

Thus, even under Leuben, the responses of

Nauss and Neilson, and the entire line of questioning viewed as a
whole, fell within the range of evidence distinguished in Leuben as
impermissible.
2.

Id.

The Court of Appeals Misapplied Rule 704

Rule 704 Utah R.Evid., modeled on the federal rule abolished
the prohibition on opinion testimony going to an "ultimate issue of
fact."

Relying on Leuben, the Court of Appeals apparently read

Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it goes to
an issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is not a legal
conclusion.

(Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493). This incorrect approach

stands Rule 704 on its head.
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Under Rule 704, evidence does not become admissible because it
goes to an ultimate fact; rather it cannot be excluded only because
it goes to an issue of ultimate fact.3

Testimony going to an

ultimate fact issue may be inadmissible for other reasons; e.g.,
where, as here, that testimony embodies a legal conclusion. Scop,
846 F.2d at 139-40.
The intent of Rule 704 is to eliminate the labelling problem
created by the ultimate fact rule.
Advisory

Committee

Committee Notes).

Notes

and

Rule

(See Rule 704, Utah R.Evid.
704

Fed.R.Evid.

Advisory

Yet the Court of Appeals' approach replaces on

label with another.

To say an issue is one of ultimate fact and

not a legal opinion simply states the result and fails to clarify
the basis for determination.

"Materiality" in the context of a

securities claim cannot be neatly labelled as a legal or a fact
issue; it is a conclusion reached by applying an objective legal
standard to a set of facts.

Here, the analysis must focus on

whether the expert improperly supplants the judge as law giver and
as the jury instructor and on whether the opinions are "phrased in
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria."

Scop, 846 F.2d at

140.

3

"The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the
bars so as to admit all opinion. . . . [Rule 403, 701 and 702]
afford ample assurances against opinions which would merely tell
the jury what result to reach." Marx, 550 F.2d at 511 n.17, citing
Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rule 704, Fed. R. Evid.
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The testimony of Nauss and Neilson is not troublesome because
they gave evidence of a factual predicate for materiality.

The

error occurred when they were permitted in effect to instruct the
jury that in their opinion the Defendant

failed to disclose

material facts; in essence, that the Defendant was guilty.
Transcript, Tr. 766-767, 899-900).

(Trial

This is not proper, as the

Court explained in Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 770 F.2d
1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
expert testimony

There, the trial court excluded proffered

based on broach hypothetical

questions that

assumed every relevant fact that required the expert to give legal
opinions on the complex personal injury case, including proximate
cause. 16.. at 1311. The Court affirmed, noting that the defendant
was "asking his expert to tell the jury what result to reach after
having been told all of the facts possibly relevant to the case."
Id. at 1311.

This case is no different.

By admitting Nauss and

Neilsonfs testimony, the trial court allowed the State's experts to
instruct the jury on its result after rehearsing the facts of the
State's case.
This error is compounded

by Mr. Neilson's status as an

attorney and securities regulator.

The forceful impact of his

ostensibly vast, specialized knowledge as an attorney in the
securities area prevented subsequent correction of his improper
testimony.

This was explained in Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805

(10th Cir. 1988).

In Specht, a 1983 Civil Rights action for

unlawful search, an attorney expert-witness for the plaintiff
21
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considered "hypothetical" circumstances which, according to the
court, merely restated the plaintiffs' view of the evidence.
at 807.

Id.

The attorney witness testified that as a constitutional

expert, he believed no consent had been given and that the search
violated constitutional rights. Id. at 809. The Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the witness supplanted both the trial court
and jury with the "array of legal conclusions." ^d. The error was
not harmless:
[G]iven the pervasive nature of this testimony, we cannot conclude its admission was
harmless. There is a significant difference
between an attorney who states his belief of
what law should govern the case and any other
expert witness.
Id. at 808.
Like the attorney witness in Specht, Mr. Neilson, an attorney
and securities regulator, "imbued with all the mystique inherent in
the title 'expert,'" heightened the "substantial danger" that "the
jury simply adopted the expert's conclusions rather than making its
own decision."

_Id. at 809.

The error of admitting his testimony

could not be corrected by cross-examination, rebuttal, or instruction as the Court of Appeals suggests. Id. See also United States
v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984) (testimony by bankruptcy
judge concerning his prior order and availability of interim fees
not curable by cross-examination); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners'
Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1977) (" [Compelling the
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opponent to cross-examine to repair the damage is to invite
disaster").
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE OF SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2)
AND (3) AND 61-1-21.
The Amended Information in the instant case charged three
different theories to prove a violation of the Securities Fraud
Statute.

The trial court instructed the jury that the specific

intent to defraud was only an element of one of the three theories
set forth in the Securities Fraud Statute. In Instruction No. 26,
the Court advised the jury in part pertinent hereto, that:
In order for you to find the defendant guilty
under the theory that he employed a device,
scheme or artifice to defraud, the State of
Utah must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
it was the defendant's specific intent to
defraud some person.
However, later in the instruction, the Court noted that:
Even if you find that the defendant acted in
good faith, however, you shall still convict
the defendant if the State establishes beyond
a reasonable doubt each element of either one
of the other two theories, (1) that the defendant made an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a necessary fact, or
(2) that the defendant engaged in an act,
practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate to defraud or deceive.
Additionally, in Instruction No. 24, this Court advised the
jury that with regard to the false representation or omission
theory:
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You are instructed that no amount of belief,
honest or otherwise, by the defendant that any
enterprise or business would ultimately make
money for the investors excuses or justifies
false representations or omissions willfully
made by him. Therefore, to the extent that
there exists any such belief, it does not
constitute a defense to the crimes alleged in
this case if you find that the defendant has
engaged in willful misstatements or omissions.
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on numerous occasions that
a jury must be instructed with regard to all the legal elements
that it must find in order to convict a defendant of the crime
charged, and the absence of such an instruction is reversible error
as a matter of law.

See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980).

In State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985), the Court stated,
"The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic
elements of an offense is essential.
constitutes reversible error."

Failure to so instruct

Id. at 239.

Thus, the failure to

give an appropriate elements instruction can never be deemed
harmless error. See State v. Jones, 177 Utah Adv.Rep. 3 (1/14/92).
In State v. Jones, the defendant's counsel failed to object to the
lack of an elements instruction on aggravated kidnapping.

The

Supreme Court ruled that the absence of a proper elements instruction constituted
conviction.
whether

the

clear error and required

a reversal of the

.Id. at 4. Thus, in the instant matter, regardless of
Defendant's

predecessor

counsel

objected

to the

foregoing instructions, the fact that the jury was not instructed
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in an elements instruction that the specific intent to defraud was
an element of each of the three theories set forth under U.C.A.
§ 61-1-1 constitutes clear error and requires the granting of a new
trial.
The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial
on this issue, again relying upon the precedent of this Court in
State v. Larsen, supra.

The Defendant submits that the Larsen

Court erroneously failed to construe U.C.A. § 61-1-1(2) in harmony
with the United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
related federal provisions (Rule 10b-5) on which § 61-1-1 was
patterned.
1.

Section 61-1-1 Was Patterned After Rule 10b-5.

In 1963, the Utah Legislature adopted (with certain revisions
unimportant here) the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform Act"). This
is known as the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah Act").
U.C.A. § 61-1-28.

See

Section 101 of the Uniform Act (§ 61-1-1 of

Utah's Act) was patterned after Federal Securities and Exchange
Commission

("SEC") Rule

X-10B-5

(Rule

10b-5).

See Uniform

Securities Act § 101, Official Comment, reprinted in Louis B. Loss,
Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 6 (1976). The language of
the three classes of proscribed activity under § 61-1-1 and Rule
10b-5 is identical.

Compare U.C.A. § 61-1-1 and 17 C.F.R.

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§ 240.10b-5.

Consistently, under both § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5,

criminal penalties are set for any "willful" violation.4

U.C.A.

§ 61-1-21; 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
Another holding in the Larsen case was that "willfulness" and
not "specific intent to defraud" is the required mental state in a
criminal securities fraud prosecution under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and
61-1-21 (1989).

"The trial court, therefore, properly instructed

the jury that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities
fraud is 'willfulness1 rather than specific intent as proposed by
Larsen."

828 P.2d at 495.

The intent of Rule 10b-5 was derived from § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), (not § 17a of
the 1933 Act), which empowered the SEC to act and which provided
the standard of liability that must be imposed.

425 U.S. at 200.5

Rule 10b-5 "was adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission under § 10(b) . . .to carry into effect the will of Congress
as expressed by the statute."

(425 U.S. at 212-13).

The

4

Mr. Harry does not challenge the trial court's instruction on
"willfulness." (Instruction No. 12; Tr. 250). Willfulness is also
an element of a § 61-1-1 violation. The trial court and the Larsen
court erred by refusing to instruct that scienter was a separate,
additional element of the offense.
5

Congress fashioned standards of fault on a particularized
basis under the securities laws. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. at 200.
"Ascertainment of congressional intent with
respect to the standard of liability created by a particular
section of the Acts must therefore rest on the language of that
section." Id. Here, the sole focus of inquiry is § 10(b) under
which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated. Congressional intent for other
sections, such as § 17a of the 1933 Act, is thus irrelevant.
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Draftsmen's Commentary to § 101 of the Uniform Act confirms that
Rule 10b-5 was "the logical model" for a uniform state fraud
provision because of the language disparities in existing state
statutes and "because of the substantial body of judicial precedent
which has been developed under the federal provisions."

Louis B.

Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 7 (1976) (emphasis
supplied).
This comment also reveals that the draftsmen anticipated that
adopting states would construe § 101 in harmony with federal court
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. A prominent commentator on Utah law
(Professor Wallace Bennett) presumed that federal and state court
construction of like provisions would be identical. See Wallace F.
Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of History and the
New Uniform Act, 1963 Utah L. Rev. 216, 232 n.112 ("Similarity to
the federal statute will allow for interchangeability of judicial
precedence in this important area").
Utah's legislature expressed synonymous intent. Aware of the
Utah Act's federal origin, Utah's legislature declared that the Act
was intended not only to encourage uniformity among the states, but
"to coordinate

the interpretation

and administration

chapter with the related federal regulation."

of this

U.C.A. § 61-1-27

(emphasis supplied). The Utah Act should be construed to effectuate this "general purpose".

Id.

In U.S. v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580 (D.C. Mass. 1959), affirmed
in Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960), the eminent Judge
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i

Wyzanski directly addressed the issue of whether specific intent to
defraud

is an element of federal securities fraud under the

Securities Act of 1933:
"To secure a conviction under Count 10 the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt not merely that there was an omission,
that the omission was material and that Danser
knew of the omission, but also that Danser
intended to defraud,"
26 F.R.D. at 588 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has definitively held that a
private civil action for damages will not lie under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, in the absence of a specific allegation of intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,.

In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,

425 U.S. 193 (1976), the Court held as follows:
We granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether a private cause of action for
damages will lie under Sec. 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of
"scienter" -- intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud. 421 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 1557, 43
L.Ed.2d 773 (1975). We conclude that it will
not and therefore we reverse.
425 U.S. at 193 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
In Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977), the 10th Circuit expounded upon the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ernst as follows:
A significant clarification has taken place
in this body of law as a result of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). Prior to this decision
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there had been a division in the circuits as
to the need for proving scienter. Ernst &
Ernst, supra, has settled this conflict by
holding that proof of negligence is not enough
in a 10b-5 action; that such an action will
not lie in the absence of an allegation and
proof of scienter, the same being an "intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
425 U.S. 193, 96 S.Ct. at 1381 (emphasis added).
Therefore, based upon the foregoing analysis of case law and
Utah statutes, Defendant submits that the State was required at
trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
specifically intended to defraud the investors named in Counts 1
through 3 and Private Ledger in Count 4 of the Amended Information
under all three of the theories set forth in the elements Instruction Nos. 30-34.

Failure to so instruct the jury deprived the

Defendant of a fair trial and his rights to due process of law
under both the Utah and United States Constitutes were therefore
violated.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION
TO THE JURY THAT THE GOOD FAITH OF THE DEFENDANT WAS A
COMPLETE DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION UNDER U.C.A §§
61-1-1(1), (2), (3) AND 61-1-21.
Again, the Larsen case effectively resolves this issue in
favor of the State by implication.

The good faith defense is the

flip side of the specific intent coin.

If the prosecution must

prove that the Defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud
the victim, then the Defendant can defend by claiming that he acted

29
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with subjective good faith, and without an intent to defraud the
victim.
i

Although the issue of whether the "good faith" of a defendant
in a criminal securities fraud prosecution constitutes a defense
has not been directly addressed by the Utah Supreme Court, the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals has directly addressed this question in
numerous cases involving the federal criminal securities fraud and
mail fraud statutes.

In Frank v. U.S., 220 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.

1955), the defendant argued that the following jury instruction,
which rejected a defense of "good faith", was erroneous:
"It is contended by the defendant vigorously
that he believed the statements he made and
that there was no intention upon his part to
commit a fraud. However, you are instructed
that if the statements made by the defendant
were false and there was no basis for such
statements except the hope and belief of the
defendant that he could produce the oil, and
that he made the statements in good faith,
that contention would be no defense, becausse
if the statements within themselves were false
or based purely upon speculation and caused
the investors to rely upon the statements €is
true, the defendant's acts would constitute an
offense regardless of his good faith."

j

220 F.2d at 564-65 (emphasis added).
The 10th Circuit Court rejected this instruction and held as
follows:

'

While the meaning of this instruction is not
entirely clear, we are forced to conclude that
it, in effect, declares that, if the jury
should find that false statements were made
which were relied upon by investors, an ofDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fense was committed even if such statements
were made in good faith.
This was an erroneous instruction.
220 F.2d at 565 (emphasis added).
In several cases subsequent to Frank, the 10th Circuit Court
has consistently reaffirmed that "good faith" is a complete defense
to a criminal prosecution under the federal securities fraud and
mail fraud statutes.

See Beck v. U.S., 305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.

1962); Steiger v. U.S., 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1962); Sparrow v.
U.S., 402 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1968); U.S. v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285
(10th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401 (10th Cir. 1988);
and U.S. v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1988).
After reviewing its previous decisions in Beck and Steiger,
that "good faith is a complete defense to a mail fraud prosecution, " the 10th Circuit Court in Sparrow held as follows:
Thus the good faith of the defendant in the
plan or scheme and good faith intention to
carry out the promises and representations
constitutes a defense which the defendant may
assert in a prosecution both under the Mail
Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341, and the
fraud portions of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. Sec. 77q(a).
402 F.2d at 828-29 (emphasis added).
Recently, in U.S. v. Cronic, supra, the 10th Circuit Court
stated that:

"We have long held that good faith is a complete

defense to a mail fraud charge as have other circuits."
added).

839 F.2d at 1403.

(Emphasis

The Court was merely reiterating the

doctrine it had declared in 1968 that the good faith of a defendant
31
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"in the plan or scheme and good faith intention to carry out the
promises and representations" constitutes a complete defense to a
securities fraud prosecution.

Sparrow v. U.S., supra, at 402 F.2d

828-29.
When a defense to a criminal prosecution is raised, whether by
the defendant's or the prosecution's own evidence, the prosecution
has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense
does not apply.

State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) (when

self-defense is raised as a defense, the prosecution has the burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in
self-defense).

The trial court's failure to give a good faith

instruction deprived the Defendant of his most important factual
defense —

that he had a good faith belief that there would be no

future payments in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership.
(See Instruction 24; Tr. 262 - good faith not a defense).

The

trial court's refusal to submit an instruction applying good faith
to all three of the State's theories denied the Defendant his right
to a fair trial and due process of law under both the Utah and
United States Constitutions and he is therefore entitled to a new
trial on all four counts of Securities Fraud.

32

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT

IV

THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE NECESSITATE GRANTING THE
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL ON COUNTS 1, 2 AND 3 BECAUSE
HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
The applicable standard in assessing an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was set forth in Strickland v. Washington/ 466
U.S. 668 (1984).

This case set forth a two-part standard for

evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first
prong is that "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show
that counsel's representations fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."

466 U.S. at 687-688. The second prong requires

that "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different."
1.

Id.

at 694.

Trial Counsel's Representations Fell Below an Objective
Standard of Reasonableness.

The first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing
more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence.
Thus, the inquiry must focus upon whether the counsel's advice or
representation of the defendant "was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal matters." McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
In the instant matter, the errors and omissions of trial
counsel which "fall outside the wide range of professional and
competent assistance" demanded of attorneys in criminal cases are
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enumerated below.

See, State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah

1986):
1. Defense counsel failed to deliver an opening statement to
the jury in a complicated securities fraud trial.
strategic decision.

This was not a

Defense counsel intended to give an opening

statement but failed to give one because he forgot (Tr. 956-957).
2.

Based upon Mr. Thornton's testimony, the State contended

in Count 1 that Mr. Thornton had no knowledge of the possibility of
future payments. However, Mr. Thornton's testimony that he had no
knowledge of the possibility of any future payments could have been
easily and convincingly contradicted by the introduction of the
signed and notarized Subscription Agreement (Tr. 467-477) as well
as the initialled Suitability Questionnaire (Tr. 454-463).

Trial

counsel failed to introduce either the Subscription Agreement or
the Suitability Questionnaire, notwithstanding that the Defendant
had specifically advised him that he should impeach Mr. Thornton
with the aforementioned documents. When trial counsel realized he
had neglected to introduce the Subscription Agreement and the
Suitability

Questionnaire

through

Mr.

Thornton,

the

State's

witness, it was too late — Mr. Thornton had been released and had
returned to Yuma, Arizona. The State objected to the introduction
of the documents through the Defendant, and as a result, these
critically important documents were not presented to the jury.
3.

Trial

counsel

failed

to demonstrate

Mr. Thornton's

suitability for the Red River Mountain investment. Notwithstanding
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Mr. Thornton's testimony, his net worth was $1,000,000.00; his
stock and bond portfolio were valued in excess of $400,000.00; he
was a partner in a trailer park development in Sandy, Utah with an
approximate value of $300,000.00 to $400,000.00 where Mr. Thornton
was subject to unlimited liability; and the $15,000.00 investment
in the Red River Mountain limited partnership represented less than
two percent (2%) of Mr. Thornton's net worth and four percent (4%)
of his investment portfolio. Thus, the Red River Mountain investment was well within the reasonable limits of the "prudent man"
investment rule.

Defendant provided his trial counsel with an

outline of the foregoing points, but trial counsel failed to
explore the foregoing points.

(See Appendix 1, Defendant's post-

trial Exhibits 5, 6 and 7).
4. Trial counsel failed to demonstrate the suitability of the
Red River Mountain limited partnership for Mr. Issacs in Count 2.
Mr. Issacs had a portfolio value of over $600,000.00; he had
participated in at least ten other partnerships; and a $30,000,00
investment in the Red River Mountain limited partnership represented only five percent

(5%) of his total portfolio value.

Notwithstanding Mr. Issacs' testimony, the investment in the Red
River Mountain limited partnership constituted reasonable diversification and satisfied the "prudent man" investment rule. Again,
the Defendant provided his trial counsel with an outline of the
foregoing points, but trial counsel failed to explore the foregoing
points. (See Appendix 2, Defendant's post-trial Exhibits 1 and 2).
35
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5. Trial counsel failed to demonstrate the suitability of the
Red River Mountain limited partnership for Mr. Brgoch in Count 3.
Mr. Brgoch had a portfolio value of over $600,000.00; he had been
a participant in at least 14 other partnerships; the $30,000.00
investment in the Red River Mountain Investment represented only
five percent (5%) of his total portfolio value. The investment in
the Red River Mountain limited partnership constituted reasonable
diversification and satisfied the "prudent man" investment rule.
The Defendant provided his trial counsel with an outline of the
foregoing points, but trial counsel failed to explore the foregoing
points. (See Appendix 3, Defendant's post-trial Exhibits 3 and 4).
6. Without objection from counsel, the State was permitted to
introduce the opinion of Ms. Nauss, the Private Ledger compliance
officer, that the Defendant's conduct violated the internal rules
and regulations of Private Ledger.

Ms. Nauss based her opinions

upon the Private Ledger compliance manual.

However, this manual

was not mailed to the Defendant until after two of the Red River
Mountain sales had been consummated and was not returned by the
Defendant to Private Ledger until after the final sale had been
completed

(Tr. 715-716).

Moreover, the testimony is neither

relevant nor probative on the issue of whether this Defendant
violated U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21.

Defendant submits that

under Rule 403 this evidence should have been excluded.
Similarly, Ms. Nauss was also permitted to testify that
Private Ledger could have been subjected to civil liability as a
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result of the Defendant's "selling away" and failure to disclose a
material fact - the possibility of future payments:
Q

Now besides the fact that Private Ledger was denied a
potential of some commissions; what other harm did this
conduct of not notifying Private Ledger of Red River
Mountain subject Private Ledger to?

A

Well, if someone who made an investment in that product
were hurt by making that investment, they may assume that
Private Ledger had been involved in and that we were a
party to that transaction, even though they didn't even
know about it, and weren't asked to review it. And
didn't have the opportunity to say whether or not our
representative could sell it. They may assume, because
the representative was licensed with the firm, that we
were a party to the transaction.

Q

In your experience, could that cause the risk of a
lawsuit, regardless of whether you might win it in the
end—the risk you have to go through in a lawsuit and
other litigation, in your experience?

A

Yes.

Q

And those, I take it, could be expensive matters for
Private Ledger.

A

They could be very expensive.

It could.

(Trial Transcript, Tr. 724-725).
As with the unobjected questions discussed

supra, these

questions had no probative value, and should have been excluded
under Rule 403, Utah R.Evid.

Even if this Court declines to reach

the improperly preserved issue under Strickland v. Washington,
supra, the Defendant submits that it was plain error under State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) and State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29
(Utah 1989), and should therefore be reviewed under that precedent.
Finally, although trial counsel did object when the State
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began

to

introduce

testimony

concerning

the

NASD

rules and

regulations, he neglected to move to strike the testimony.

The

NASD is a voluntary organization of securities dealers and brokers.
A violation of NASD rules , and regulations has no bearing upon
whether this Defendant violated U.C.A. § 61-1-1.

The following

colloquy occurred before the jury:
Q

What is that relationship [the securities regulations of
the State of Utah and the NASD rules]?

A

First its contained in Rule 177-6-1G. That rule refers
to ethical or unethical and dishonest practices of
broker-dealer agents. One of the provisions of that rule

Mr. Barber:

Objection to any of the provisions your Honor.
The rule is the best evidence. It is hearsay.

(Trial Transcript, Tr. 881-882).
The Defendant submits that the proper objection should have
been Rule 403, Utah R.Evid., not hearsay.

An expert is permitted

to base his testimony upon hearsay. The NASD rules and regulations
would clearly be within the scope of this witness' expertise.
Accordingly, defense counsel should have been arguing that even a
deviation from industry standards - as evidenced by a violation of
NASD rules and regulations - had no probative value, or alternatively, that the minimal probative value was outweighed by the
extraordinary prejudicial effect upon the jury.

After extensive

arguments with the Court, the State elected to forego this line of
inquiry.

However, defense counsel did not request that the

testimony be stricken.

As a result, the jury was left with the

lingering impression that the Defendant's conduct was unethical.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

Marshalling the facts in support of the trial court's denial
of a motion for a new trial, it could be said that all of counsel's
omissions were conscious, strategic decisions and that none of the
omissions would have altered the outcome of the case. However, the
Defendant submits that these omissions evidence that trial "counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner."
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (1989).
2.

Prejudice Requirement.

The second, or prejudice requirement, under the Strickland v.
Washington and State v. Verde tests focuses upon whether counsel's
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of
the trial process.

In other words, in order to satisfy the

prejudice requirement, the Defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors and omissions,
the result of the trial would have been different.

As stated in

Strickland, 446 U.S. at 686:
[T]he benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.
In the instant matter, the second part of the Strickland test
has also been met. The cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors
or omissions certainly undermines confidence in the jury's verdicts
on Counts 1, 2 and 3.

The failure to present an opening statement

in a complicated securities fraud trial is remarkable.

Further-

more, the failure of trial counsel to challenge the representations

39

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the three investors with regard to the suitability of the Red
River Mountain limited partnership, in view of the fact that the
Defendant had provided his counsel with a detailed outline of their
investment histories which included participation in both land
deals, partnerships, and long term investments falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness and certainly leads one to the
ineluctable conclusion that but for counsel's defective performance, a different outcome could have been reached on all three of
these Counts.

Finally, with respect to Count 1, the failure of

trial counsel to introduce a signed and notarized Subscription
Agreement which would have directly contradicted Mr. Thornton's
testimony cannot be emphasized enough. Mr. Thornton's credibility
was essential to the State's prosecution in Count 1.

Had trial

counsel introduced the signed and notarized Subscription Agreement
which clearly set forth the existence of the possibility of future
payments, there can be little doubt that Mr. Thornton's credibility
would have been seriously impeached.
Under the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
the Defendant has satisfied the two-prong test.

For all of these

reasons, the interests of justice will best be served by granting
the Defendant a new trial on Counts 1, 2 and 3.
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POINT

V

THE FACTS PROVEN AT TRIAL DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC
OFFENSE IN COUNT 4 OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION,
Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court, dissenting on other
grounds, stated in the Utah Supreme Court case of State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989):

". . . The whole thrust of

criminal procedure in the area of appellate review of criminal
convictions has been to try to avoid, where possible, collateral
attacks on criminal convictions.

For that reason, it makes sense

to address at the earliest possible stage errors which might lead
to reversals. . ."

773 P.2d at 42.

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may,
or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do
not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other
good cause for the arrest of judgment. . . .
The facts proven at trial do not constitute a public offense
with regard to Count 4.

The contracts and documents executed

between Private Ledger and the Defendant do not constitute either
a device, a representation, or a course of business, in connection
with the offer, sale or purchase of any security as required under
U.C.A. § 61-1-1.

As Ms. Nauss admitted, the Defendant did not

receive the manual prohibiting discretionary accounts at any of the
relevant times to this case.

Indeed, the manual was not received

by the Defendant until May 3, 1988. It was not returned to Private
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ledger until May 11, 1988, more than one month after the purchase
of the Red River Mountain interests by all three investors (Tr.
715).

The facts proven by the State may constitute a breach of

'

contract with Private Ledger, but they do not constitute the
commission of a public offense.
In State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah

{

Court of Appeals ruled that whenever the State advances a unique or
novel theory of criminal liability in what normally would be a
civil business situation, the appellate courts will require the

i

prosecution to meet the "incumbent burden of sound reasoning and
persuasive authority" in order to uphold a guilty verdict." In the
Burton case, the Defendant attempted to sell a home to one Waldron.

i

The home in question was encumbered by two trust deeds, with the
first trust deed containing

a "due on sale" clause, barring

assumption of the note obligation by any subsequent purchaser.

<

Waldron was unable to obtain financing through the note holder with
the "due on sale" clause, so he entered into a private financing
agreement with Burton.

Waldron was to make monthly payments to

(

Burton, who would then make the mortgage payment to the holder of
the trust deed with the "due on sale" clause.

It would not be

reported to the holder of the "due on sale" clause that the home

<

had been sold to another purchaser without the bank's permission.
Although it was understood that Burton was to make the
mortgage payments to the bank, it was not explicit in the agreement
executed by the parties. Subsequently, Burton obtained the monthly
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(

payments from Waldron, but failed to make those payments to the
bank which resulted in the bank's ultimate foreclosure on the
property. The State brought theft charges against Burton, claiming
that his failure to apply the payments he had received from Waldron
to the bank constituted the crime of theft.
In analyzing the case, Judge Orme stated as follows:
The state advances a unique theory of criminal
liability in this case. It is quite telling
that neither side has presented the court with
any decision validating or precluding the
criminal prosecution of what is essentially a
breach of a real estate sale agreement. We
are not unreceptive to novel theories of law
when they are supported by firm logic and have
some basis, even if tangential, in established
precedent.
However, the more unique the
innovation, the greater will be the incumbent
burden of sound reasoning and persuasive
authority. Such reasoning and authority are
notably absent in this case.
In that posture, we are loath to give approval
to the broad construction of Section 76-6-404
(the theft statute) urged upon us by the
state. Were we to do so, it is likely that
memorials of commercial transactions would
soon be drafted to include boilerplate : anguage designed to impose criminal liab^^ ty
for interruptions in the stream of payments
— a circumstance which would normally be
nothing more than a breach of contract, traditionally viewed as adequately remedied through
an action of law.
800 P.2d at 819.
It can be readily seen that the facts established by the State
in the instant matter might establish an actionable breach of
contract by the Defendant and enforceable by Private Ledger.
However, this is precisely the situation Judge Orme indicated in
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State v. Burton/ supra, should be handled civilly and not criminally. The effort by the Attorney General's Office to bootstrap this
civil breach of contract (Count 4) into a criminal prosecution must
be rejected by this Court.

In any event, the conduct alleged in

Count 4 — selling away — is the same conduct alleged by the State
to constitute a material omission in the sale of the securities in
Counts 1, 2, and 3.

Count 4 must therefore merge with the first

three counts of the Information.
POINT

VI

THE FACTS PROVEN AT TRIAL DO NOT CONSTITUTE
A PUBLIC OFFENSE IN EITHER COUNTS 2 OR 3.
The State did not prove a violation of the Securities Fraud
Statute in Counts 2 or 3 because there were no misrepresentations
or omissions made "in connection with" the sale or purchase of the
Red River Mountain Units. All of the transactions were executed by
the Defendant before any statements which might be characterized as
either misrepresentations or omissions were made by the Defendant
to either Mr. Issacs or Mr. Brgoch.

Both Issacs and Brgoch
i

testified that they had delegated the authority to make investment
decisions for them to the Defendant and that he had invested their
money in Red River Mountain before they knew that the investment
i

had been made. The record is clear; indeed, there is not one shred
of evidence that Defendant Harry made any representation to either
Issacs or Brgoch regarding Red River Mountain before he exercised
i

his discretionary delegated authority.
44

The Defendant's alleged
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misrepresentations therefore did not occur "in connection with" the
offer or sale of securities because he never made any representations to either Issacs or Brgoch regarding Red River Mountain
before the sale of the security was completed.
In the absence of Utah law focusing upon the "in connection
with the offer, sale or purchase" requirement of U.C.A. § 61-1-1,
it is appropriate to look at the case law that has developed around
similarly worded federal provisions.

The language of Section

61-1-1(2) tracks closely with Section 17(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly --

To obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading. . .
The foregoing federal statute has been interpreted in numerous
federal appellate decisions.

In Braka v. Multibanch Comermex,

S.A., 589 F.Supp. 802 (SDNY 1984), plaintiff/purchasers brought an
action under 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) to recover money allegedly owed on
two certificates of deposit and to rescind the certificates and
recover damages. The district court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss in part because the alleged misrepresentations and nondisDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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closures of the defendant occurred after the sales to plaintiffs
and therefore could not be in "in connection" with the sales of
securities.

"It is well established that a misrepresentation or a

nondisclosure,

to

be

actionable

under

§77q/

must

occur

'in

connection1 with the sale, i.e. at or before the time the buyer
commits himself to the sale."

Id.

at 805 n.3 (emphasis added).

Resource Investors Group v. National Resource Inv. Corp., 457
F.Supp. 194 (E.D. Mich. 1978), presented a situation where one of
the defendants charged with a violation of U.S.C. § 78j(b) had had
no relationship with any of the parties in the lawsuit until after
the plaintiff had purchased working interests in certain oil and
gas wells.

The district court granted defendant's motion for

summary judgment because defendant "could not have participated in
any fraud 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. ' "

Id. at 197 (emphasis added).

The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an action for
injunctive sanctions alleging that the defendants had participated
in securities law violations in connection with a merger in
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. National Student Marketing Corp.,
457 F.Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
the required

In that case the court addressed

"nexus" between the alleged misconduct

purchase or sale of a security.

and the

The court concluded that:

"Once

the decision is made and the parties are irrevocably committed to
the transaction, there is little justification for penalizing
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alleged omissions or misstatements which occur thereafter and which
Id.

have no effect on the decision."

at 703.

In Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder
Peabody & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986), the investor
brought an action against the securities dealer who executed
transactions initiated by the investor's agent, and which resulted
in losses.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that there could be no

violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when the plaintiff had
transferred to its agent full authority to make investment decisions:
The Congregation made no investment decisions;
it hired Mr. Newell [like Mr. Harry in the
instant case] for that purpose. Mr. Newell
had 'full discretion to develop and implement
a prudent portfolio strategy.'
800 F.2d at 181.
In the instant matter, there was no "investment decision" to
be made after the time when both Issacs and Brgoch learned of the
necessity for future payments and that the investment had been made
in Red River Mountain.
The Defendant might have had exposure under a different
criminal statute.

However, the State elected not to charge the

Defendant with the offense of Unlawful Dealing with Property by a
Fiduciary (U.C.A. § 76-6-513), and instead alleged a violation of
the Securities Fraud Statute.

The Defendant's "market transac-

tions" with Issacs and Brgoch were not violative of U.C.A.
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§ 61-1-1.

The Defendant did not discuss the Red River Mountain

investments with either Issacs or Brgoch before making the investment.

Thus, there were no omissions or misrepresentations, as

required by U.C.A. § 61-1-1 to "make the statements made not
misleading."
The facts established by the State do not constitute the
public offense of Securities Fraud, and therefore, judgment of
acquittal on Counts 2 and 3 is mandated by the provisions of Rule
23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In the alternative,

the Defendant submits that he is entitled to a new trial due to the
Court's refusal to grant the Defendant's Motion for Directed
Verdict at the end of the State's case.

The Court's refusal in

this regard had "a substantial effect upon the rights of the
Defendant" and thereby constitutes a basis for the granting of a
new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
CONCLUSION
For

the

above

reasons,

this

Court

should

reverse

the

Defendant's convictions and remand the matter for a new trial.

DATED t h i s

J^

day of

/VfiAJll

, 1993.

V^^ioPM 7"
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JRf,
Attorney for Defendant
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of
the foregoing to be mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid,
this 0i\
day of
k ^ J |, 1993, to:
David Sonnenreich
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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VIRL THORNTON
I.

Only bought because he thought my father and I had.
A.

He seems confused as to who my father is.
1.

Father-Gordon Harry

2.

Believes
did .
a.

/
y3.

B.

owned cleaners, when grandfather

Did know however that grandfather
Az. (Tr pg.47)(how is that?)

lived in

Never made any previous investments decisions as
to whether or not either my father/grandfather or
1 had participated.

Suitability
1.

Networth over $1,000,000
a.

jL.
y

Stock & bond Portfolio- over $400,000

Partner in development of trailer park in Sandy,
It. approx value o? $3-400,000. (Tr pg. 24)
a.

unlimited liability

3.

$15,000 investment less than 2% of networth, 4% of
investment
portfolio.
Well within reasonable
limits of "prudent-man".

4.

Red River well within parameters of preservation
of principal, with growth potential, if deal was
as presented.

5.

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

father

Grandfather-Elbert Harry

a.

Spends every winter in
Arizona.
Arizona real estate market.

b.

Has not lost any money in this partnership.

I told
him
offer ing.

Private

Ledger

not

Knows

involved

in

a.

(Tr pg.ll) Did I make any representation
regarding PL involvement?- "No"

b.

(Tr pg.13) Can't remember whether P/L name
is on door. (it is)
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(

page 2
c.

6.

(Tr pg.20) Can't remember if document was
bound.
(it was)

Acknowledges signing supscription agreement.
a.

Question as to whether he wrote in number "3"
or read page 5, was never answered. (Tr pg.
62)
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP PORTFOLIO
for
VIRL THORNTON

PROGRAM

APPROX
AMOUNT

YEAR

TYPE

Oil/Gas Exploration

10, 000

1978

Oil & Gas

Enviordvne

15, 000

1979

Real Estat

Unknown

7, 500

1979

Oil & Gas

Equity Oil

10, 000

1980

Oil & Gas

Sandy Mobile Home
Park

135, 000

1981

Real Estat
DeveloDe

Unknown

10, 000

1983

Oil & Gas

Centruty Prop

25, 000

1984

Real Estat

Hampton Inns

50, 000

1986

Hotel Dev

Red River LTD

15, 000

1988

Real Estat
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DEFENDANT
EXHIBIT
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IKE ISAACS
Suitability
A.

Portfolio value over $600,000

B.

Participant
1.

in at least

Acknowledges that RR is partnership

C.

Acknowledges an
73, S3)

D.

$30,000
investment
divers i ficat ion .

E.

10 other partnerships.

objective of

5%

of

(Tr pg 85)

some growth. (Tr pg. 72-

portfolio.

if

shown

that

Reasonable

1..

Could
be dangerous
additional payments.

I

knew

of

2.

Has history of involvement with at least one other
partnership with additional payments.

Knows Phoenix real estate (Tr pg 80)

Power of Attorney
A.

Acknowledging my authority to trade for his benefit
pg. 73, 74, 75, 80, 86, 93

B.

Sonnenreich did not establish whether
a P/L deal . (Tr pg 78)

C.

Established
that
questions
investment was made. (Tr pg 87
1.

D.

Satisfied with answers

were

(Tr

Isaacs thought RR

sometime

after

(Tr pg 87)

He was told not to make additional payments.
not deal shown to us. (Tr pg 93)
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP PORTFOLIO
for
SEYMOUR (IKE) ISAACS

PROGRAM

APPROX
SAMOUNT

YEAR

TYPE

Opt ion Spread

10,000

1975

Commodit ies

Premier Angus

20,000

1976

Cattle Feed

Can/Am

10,000

1977

Oil & Gas

Arlington Park

60,000 (Staged 1977
payments)

Real Estate/
Susidized Hsng

Century Properties

10,000

1979

Real Estate

Utah/Ohio Oil

10,000

1980

Oil & Gas

Century Properties

40,000

1984

Real Estate

Energy Income

40,000

1984

Oil & Gas

Polaris Income

40,000

1985

Equipment Lease

Red River Ltd.

30,000

1988

Real Estate
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FRANK BRGOCH
I.

Suitablity
A.

Porfolio value over $600,000

B.

Participant

C.

$30,000
investment
deivers i f icat ion .
1.

14 other partnerships.

o%

of

portfolio.

Involved with at least one other
additional payments.

Reasonable

partnership with

D.

Knows Phoenix real estate market. (Tr pg 119)

E.

States he didn't want partnerships
101)
1.

II.

in at least

Coflicts with
investment
after psuedo-retirement.

or long-term. (Tr pg

history

both before and

F.

Acknowledges real estate is suitable investment. (Tr pg
117)

G.

Visit General Partner,
him.( Tr pg 119, 122)

acknowledged

what

I

had told

Power of attorney
A.

Sonnenreich did not establics whether Brgoch thought RR
was P/L deal. (Tr pg 101)

B.

Acknowledges my authority to trade for his benefit. (Tr
pg 103, 106, 115, 118)

C.

Established
that
questions
asked
initial investment. (Tr pg 110-111)

D.

Don't make additional payments,
were shown. (Tr pg 112, 122)

some

not the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time

after

deal that we

rw

LIMITED PARNERSHIP PORTFOLIO
for
Frank Brgoch

PROGRAM

$ AMOUNT

YEAR

TYPE

Option Spread

10, 000

1975

Commod it ies

Premier Angus

20, 000

1976

Cattle Feed

Energy Management

10, 000

197S

Oil & Gas

Essex Towers

55, 000 (St aged 1977
pay ment:s)

Real Estate/
Subsidized Hsng

Century Proper ties

10, 000

1979

Real Estate

5, 000

1979

Oil & Gas

Utah/Ohio Oil

10, 000

1980

Oil & Gas

Unknown

10, 000

1980

Real Estate

Century Proper t ies

40, 000

1984

Real Estate

Energy Income

40, 000

1984

Oil Income

Polaris Income

40, 000

1985

Equipment Lease

Unknown

10, 000

1986

Real Estate

Unknown

7, 500

1987

Oil & Gas

30, 000

1988

Real Estate

Can/Am

Red River Ltd.

Z DEFENDANT'S
L
EXHIBIT
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UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT

61-1-1

61-1-1. Fraud unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

61-1-21. Penalties for violations — Limitation of prosecutions.
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter except Section 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter, or
who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false
or misleading in any material respect, shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. No person
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves that he
had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment or information may be
returned or complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the
alleged violation.

61-1-27. Construction of chapter.
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make imiform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal
regulation.
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17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"):
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
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